Abstract
A preprint of our Blueprint for Far-UVC. The report contains a comprehensive overview of the current state of knowledge for far-UVC, as well as a series of recommendations for advancing the technology’s development.
Our Work: Publications
Publications
Blueprint for Far-UVC (Preprint)
Richard D. Williamson | March 2025 | Deep investigation
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Towards a Theory of Pandemic-Proof PPE
Blueprint Biosecurity | January 2025 | Deep investigation
Abstract
Vital workers must be protected against viral threats so that critical functions of society can continue during a global pandemic. Globally, COVID-19 revealed weaknesses in the personal protective equipment (PPE) enterprise including production and distribution limitations, counterfeit and poor-quality products, and inadequate stockpiles. End users struggled with design limitations that often reduced the level of protection they were afforded and made completing their work more difficult. Moreover, requirements for PPE that could protect against a future pandemic involving a feasible, worst-case pathogen were under-characterized. This study strives to identify strategies to prepare the world for the next pandemic by ensuring that vital workers have the PPE they need to perform their jobs safely.
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Developing a Customer Screening Framework for the Life Sciences
Sarah r. carter ph.d. | March 2024 | Shallow investigation
Abstract
Since the 1970’s and the advent of recombinant DNA, biology has consistently become easier to engineer, and the pace of these advances is increasing. Many tools and capabilities for engineering biology are becoming more powerful, more affordable, and more widely available. These capabilities are critical for basic scientific research as well as advances in health, agriculture, and a wide range of applications in the burgeoning bioeconomy. However, access to these tools also raises the possibility that they could be accidentally or deliberately misused to cause harm by enabling development of toxins, pathogens, or other dangerous biological agents, including some not found in nature. Potential biological harms include high-consequence events such as the development and release of an engineered pathogen that causes a global catastrophe as well as a wide range of lower-consequence, higher-likelihood events. To prevent this type of misuse, policy experts have recommended expanding customer screening practices and policy frameworks to include a broad range of life sciences products, services, and infrastructure (Carter and DiEuliis, 2019a). Recent advances in artificial intelligence (AI) have increased this type of risk and have intensified these calls for action (Carter, et al., 2023; Helena, 2023).
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